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1. INTRODUCTION 
Vision is considered the dominant sense in humans. Most of our learning, 
understanding of the world, decisions and actions are built upon information 
acquired via vision. We rely primarily on our visual senses to interpret and 
predict the behaviours of others, to spot threat or danger in our environment, to 
orient in three-dimensional space and to derive meaning from contextual cues. It 
should therefore be of no surprise that an enormous body of work has been 
devoted to understanding how visual perception works. Perceptual processing 
entails much more than simple awareness of the sensory attributes of visual 
stimuli (i.e. sensation) – it also requires selecting the relevant information and 
suppressing the irrelevant, integrating the features into a cohesive whole and 
interpreting its significance. Somehow, we are able to transform meaningless 
signal inputs into a globally meaningful scene and do so seemingly effortlessly.  
Despite extensive research, there is still a lot we do not understand about the 
underlying structure of visual perception and the many complex cognitive 
mechanisms involved in creating a seamless phenomenological experience of 
our surroundings. Across a literature of disparate findings, there has been a 
growing need for a unitary framework to encompass and organize the current 
state of our knowledge as well as add new perspectives. One promising theory 
that is inspiring novel approaches to this field of research is the predictive 
processing framework (e.g., Friston, 2005; Hohwy, 2013; Rao & Ballard, 1999). 
Placed at the centre-stage of this theory is an impressive body of computational 
and empirical research which has delved into the theoretical and neurobiological 
implications of the effects of top-down processing on perception. It is widely 
accepted that humans are not merely passive vessels in acquiring information, 
but rather active participants in creating their own individual perceptual 
experience. In addition to the features of objective sensory information, our past 
experiences, knowledge, expectations and context all play a role in determining 
the qualitative and quantitative nature of the subjective percept. Relying on a 
generative model of previously gathered information, the perceptual system 
predicts the most likely perceptual experience and makes corrections to the 
hypothesis if the actual sensory signals violate these expectations. Optimal 
perceptual processing therefore depends on a balanced integration of top-down 
and bottom-up signals. The idea of the brain as a hypothesis-testing system was 
proposed already in the 19th century by Hermann von Helmholtz (1867) and 
was further developed during the mid-20th century cognitive revolution (e.g., 
Gregory, 1980; Neisser, 1967). However, compared to the earlier state of this 
general theoretical stance, current research has developed a better understanding 
of the brain systems mediating the top-down elaboration of sensory data as well 
as worked out apt computational models of the cognitive-perceptual information 
processing systems. It is therefore easy to understand why this approach has 
become prevalent across several domains of scientific research. 
8 
Importantly, the predictive processing framework offers new ways to 
approach individual differences research in vision. Individual variance in 
perception can arise from a range of different sources. Two people can arrive at 
a different perceptual experience of the same objective scene due to optical 
aberrations (Porter, Guirao, Cox, & Williams, 2001) or structural differences in 
early visual cortices (Schwarzkopf, Song, & Rees, 2011). A new perspective on 
top-down influences on perception also allows us to consider that individual 
differences can result from dissimilar past experiences and beliefs, or alterna-
tively because of a trait-like cognitive bias in the relative weighting of prior 
expectations versus sensory information. This opens up a whole array of topical 
research questions which have the potential to clarify the structure of vision, as 
it is still not well understood how interindividual differences in determining the 
subjective perceptual experience are acquired and organized in the mind and 
brain. A better understanding of how predispositions related to predictive 
mechanisms are expressed in individual perceptual behaviour can also prove 
useful for developing diagnostic and screening tests when linked to atypicalities 
in perceptual processing symptomatic of mental disorders. With this in mind, 
the current dissertation hopes to contribute to the ongoing efforts towards 
elucidating the cognitive organization of visual perception. Let it be noted that 
the focal point of this work is within the subjective (self-reported clarity of 
percepts) and behavioural (discrimination of stimuli) dimension with less 
emphasis on the neural dimension of perceptual processing (Ward, 2019). 
 
 
1.1. Aims of the dissertation 
The general aim of the current dissertation was to study the expression and 
structure of interindividual differences in top-down effects on visual perception. 
Cognitive higher-level factors, such as beliefs and expectations, have been 
shown to affect perceptual processing across several information processing 
stages, as demonstrated by performance on various perceptual paradigms (for 
reviews, see de Lange, Heilbron, & Kok, 2018; Gilbert & Li, 2013; O’Cal-
laghan, Kveraga, Shine, Adams, & Bar, 2017). To this end, I ask several related 
research questions: a) Can individual differences in the effects of priors be 
partially explained by a general overarching latent factor of prior effects on 
perception or are such effects better described by more narrow and specific 
categories?; b) To what extent does non-veridical perception, as induced by 
expectations, display variability between individuals and between tasks?; c) Can 
individual differences in the effects of priors be linked to certain trait dimen-
sions, specifically those measured along the spectrum of schizotypy and autism?  
In this dissertation I will argue that systematic research into stable individual 
differences in perception (in this instance, individual differences in top-down 
effects) can offer new and relevant insight into the mechanisms and principles 
of perceptual processing in general. A large portion of our knowledge regarding 
perceptual processing has been acquired through data averaged over groups of 
9 
people and generalized across populations, often downplaying or even ignoring 
the stable effects of interindividual differences on visual processes. Neverthe-
less, mapping out persistent individual variability in perceptual functions is ne-
cessary for developing general models of perception. I will also emphasize the 
relevance of applying multiple perceptual paradigms to help interpret empirical 
results and clarify the theoretical constructs of the otherwise very broad psycho-
logical phenomena related to individual differences research in the domain of 
visual perception.  
Pertaining to that general goal, the following four publications each contri-
bute to a specific aspect of knowledge addressed in depth throughout this 
dissertation. 
 
● Study I provides a theoretical background to the topic with a review of 
recent work published on the structure of individual differences in 
vision. The study aims to put into perspective the weight and comple-
xity of this field of research, as well as highlighting some of the pitfalls 
researchers have come across when applying latent variable analysis 
methods to behavioural data. 
● Study II lays the groundwork of the current dissertation by illustrating 
the presence of individual differences in basic conscious visual per-
ception in relation to nonspecific global network activity which spreads 
from higher-level brain areas to the lower levels. Interindividual 
variance was reflected in behavioural measures as well as measures of 
brain correlates. 
● Study III offers a novel approach to the study of prior effects on 
perception. We compiled a battery of established perceptual paradigms 
where top-down effects on perception had been previously de-
monstrated. By applying latent variable analysis we sought to answer 
the question whether the effects of priors could be viewed as a cohesive 
construct or whether that is an overgeneralized approach. Links with 
autistic traits and schizotypy were also analyzed. 
● In Study IV, we developed and compared several analogous tasks 
where experimentally conditioned expectations of stimulus pairs 
resulted in participants reporting subjective experience of the missing 
stimulus. We were able to show that this effect is common and can be 
reliably elicited in a paradigm where attention is diverted from the 
critical stimulus. Interestingly, the level of expression of this effect 
differed between individuals as well as between different tasks. We also 
asked whether individual differences in susceptibility to such misper-
ception were linked to autistic traits. 
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2. VISION: THE BASIC STRUCTURE AND  
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
There is already a great deal we know about how early visual processing is 
structured in the brain. Collectively, the neural cells situated in different 
hierarchical levels of the brain compute and represent the contents of the visual 
stimulation (Chalupa & Werner, 2004; Robson, 1980). The primary visual 
cortex (V1) contains specialized cells tuned to specific features of the world 
around us which enable the basic detection of edges, orientations, wavelengths 
and light intensity. Combined information  from the simple cells in the primary 
visual cortex is sent via multiple pathways to other higher regions of the extra-
striate cortex which respond not only to very simple receptive field stimulation, 
but also to many different kinds of input: a range of orientations, a range of 
spatial frequencies, input signalling motion (e.g., in V5), colour and surface 
attributes (e.g., in V4). The higher up in the hierarchical architecture of perceptual 
processing, the more integral and abstract the visual representations become, as 
input from the lower level more narrowly tuned neurons is integrated into specific 
and intricate categorical level information about objects and scenes.  
As outlined above, we have a fairly comprehensive grasp on the sensory pro-
cessing stages of vision. However, which mechanisms are involved in higher-
level perceptual organization and how the visual system manages to form a 
meaningful percept from two-dimensional image features has still not been 
exhaustively elucidated. In order to recognize an object, top-down input of past 
memories and category representations must be called upon. One central 
problem of the perceptual system is in overcoming the uncertainty inherent to 
sensory information when inferring three-dimensional objects and scenes from 
two-dimensional inputs. Any two-dimensional spread of data, as it is projected 
to the retina, has more than one possible source and thereby allows for multiple 
interpretations. Moreover, the system has to be efficient in disregarding noise 
signals from gleaning the gist of the image. Based on current brain-imaging data 
and the prevalent conceptualization of a hypothesis-testing brain, visual per-
ception can essentially be viewed as a system of probabilistic inference steered 
by top-down, memory dependent contextual modulation (e.g., Albright, 2012; 
Olshausen, 2004, 2014). In other words, the product of bottom-up processing 
becomes modulated and biased by perceptual and conceptual knowledge 
acquired by (associative) learning and former experience. This implies that the 
brain is tuned to extract statistical regularities from the environment and can 
apply those regularities to guide lower-level processing via feedback connec-
tions, thereby inferring a more probable percept and facilitating perception. The 
precise neural characteristics of the proposed hierarchical architecture of 
complex feedback and feedforward signalling are still under investigation, but 
the general principle is overall supported by empirical evidence (e.g., Lee & 
Mumford, 2003). For instance, it has been shown that activity in V1 is 
suppressed if the stimulus is predictable compared to novel input (for a review, 
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see Auksztulewicz & Friston, 2015), hence reducing redundant neural activity. 
In the context of the current dissertation, however, I mainly focus on the 
cognitive structure of top-down effects on perception and the relevance of 
individual differences for their investigation. 
 
 
2.1. Individual differences in perception 
Traditional vision science has focused primarily on studying the general rules 
and robust phenomena of visual processing in humans without concerning itself 
too much with individual variability (Boff, Kaufman, & Thomas, 1986; de-Wit 
& Wagemans, 2015). Most of our current understanding regarding basic per-
ceptual mechanisms is based on experiments inspired by the school of psycho-
physics which is dedicated to studying the mechanisms of how physical stimuli 
are perceived (and interpreted) in the brain. This can be researched by systema-
tically varying the physical properties of various stimuli and measuring the 
effects on the subjective experience of the “averaged”, typical observer. Such 
studies are traditionally performed using a large number of repetitions but a 
small number of participants, as it relies on the assumption that the general 
principles of visual perceptual processing are common across most people with 
little interindividual variance. Any individual differences in such research are 
usually treated as a source of noise, which is averaged out across groups in 
favour of detecting underlying rules and tendencies common to all human 
vision (Kanai & Rees, 2011). Nevertheless, stable individual differences con-
tinue to emerge at different stages and modalities of visual processing and 
should be viewed as a valuable research tool for understanding perception (de 
Wit & Wagemans, 2015; Mollon, Bosten, Peterzell, & Webster, 2017).  
The notion that not everyone perceives the world in the same manner is not a 
new one. In 1975 Jules Davidoff (Davidoff, 1975) penned an extensive review 
about the various short-term and long-term differences in internal percepts that 
may occur between two observers looking at the same external input. Individual 
differences in perceptual processing are multiple and varied, ranging from diffe-
rences in colour vision (Webster, 2015) and contrast sensitivity (Peterzell & 
Teller, 1996) to contradictory interpretations of ambiguous figures. It stands to 
reason that such differences are likely systematic and ultimately rooted in 
important differences of neural, structural and cognitive nature (Mollon et al., 
2017). For instance, behavioural results in visual abilities have been suc-
cessfully linked to structural differences in cortical volume (Kanai & Rees, 
2011) and neurotransmitter concentration (Van Loon et al., 2013). As a result, 
the hidden potential in investigating the sources of variance in group data is 
being discovered by researchers more and more.  
The purpose of studying individual differences in visual perception is related 
to several research driven goals. Firstly, studying stable individual differences 
in vision and how they are grouped together helps to identify common sources 
of variance and thereby improve our understanding of visual mechanisms. 
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Secondly, consistent research into individual variance – especially by applying 
multiple comparable paradigms on one sample – is a way to establish construct 
validity of theoretical concepts in the field, by assessing whether ostensibly 
similar tasks truly measure the same constructs. Lastly, it is possible to link 
individual differences in perception to other personality measures and clinical 
disorders with perceptual symptomatology, offering potential practical implica-
tions. Once we understand the separate sources behind clusters of symptoms in 
a complex disorder, this knowledge can be used to improve the specificity of 
diagnostic criteria, with hope to eventually aid in the early detection and treat-
ment of disorders. In the following sections, I will describe four studies that 
have aimed to contribute to each of these goals. 
 
 
2.2. The latent factorial structure of vision 
The first step in understanding the structure of individual differences is to 
investigate patterns and common mechanisms underlying sources of individual 
variance. One such approach entails measuring the behavioural results of a large 
subject sample on multiple visual tasks and applying an exploratory factor 
analysis to the results in order to establish the factorial structure underlying the 
data. For example, Thurstone (1944) administered 40 perceptual tests of a wide 
scope on 170 participants and concluded that the data was best summarized by 
11 perceptual factors, capturing several basic visual abilities. Alternatively, one 
might have a prior hypothesis regarding the structure of individual differences 
in a specific dimension of vision and only choose tasks which are purported to 
tap into a common mechanism. For instance, Webster and MacLeod (1988) 
only measured individual differences in colour matching tasks and explored the 
factor structure behind this specific dimension of perception. 
Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in defining the factorial 
structure of individual differences in vision. Studies have attempted to group 
vision into factors not only by the more basic early visual processing abilities, 
but also based on higher cognitive structure and function. In other words, 
individuals can differ not only in areas such as visual acuity or colour percep-
tion, but also in how they group visual elements together or in the way they are 
inclined to interpret the source of incoming sensory stimuli. For instance, it has 
been suggested that some subgroups of people are more likely to preferentially 
process local shapes as opposed to global shapes (Happé & Frith, 2006), 
whereas some people are more susceptible to perceptual illusions than others 
(Schwarzkopf et al., 2011).  
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Study I 
In Study I, I reviewed work published in the recent decade which has attempted 
to map out the factorial structure of vision. One recurring question which has 
not yet been conclusively answered is whether there exists a general ‘v’ factor 
of vision, similar to the g factor which has been proposed in many intelligence 
studies (for a comprehensive treatment on the g factor, see Jensen, 1998). This 
notion of a ‘v’ factor is based on the hypothesis that there may be some com-
mon mechanism (e.g., neural or structural) which affects all lower level per-
ceptual abilities, such that some people are simply better at visual acuity and 
discrimination tasks than others. Hence, when measuring subjects on a range of 
basic visual tasks one would expect a common factor to emerge which loads on 
most measures. Another hypothesis, although not mutually exclusive of the first 
one, would suggest that visual perception is better described as multiple more 
narrow and specific visual abilities related to different perceptual functions and 
processing stages. Evidence from work reviewed in Study I seems to favour the 
latter. Although some support for a general factor of perceptual performance 
was reported in a study by Bosten and colleagues (2017), it was only able to 
explain around 20% of the total variance in their experiment with 25 measures, 
which may not suffice to infer the existence of a general factor (Lubinski, 
2000). Other publications reviewed in Study I that tested for a general factor of 
visual perception did not find evidence to support this hypothesis (Cappe et al., 
2014; Ward, Rothen, Chang & Kanai, 2017). Instead, most studies found that 
performance on numerous low-level perceptual tasks was better explained by 
several specific factors, such as factors of magno- and parvocellular activity 
(Ward et al., 2017), perceptual capacity and working memory factors (Eayrs & 
Lavie, 2018), or the eight specific visual factors proposed by Bosten and 
colleagues (2017). 
In addition to low-level visual performance factors, it has been suggested 
that perceptual performance may be grouped by some higher order cognitive 
commonalities. For example, one dimension in perceptual processing proposed 
to share a source mechanism is the global versus local cognitive style. It has 
been suggested that most people exhibit an automatic bias in favour of global 
structure, whereas individual differences in this processing style have been 
related to expertise (Stoesz, Jakobson, Kilgour, &  Lewycky, 2007) and even 
psychopathology (Moritz & Wend, 2006; Scherf, Luna, Kimchi, Minshew, & 
Behrmann, 2008), implying long-term dispositional individual differences in 
this dimension. Nevertheless, the work reviewed in Study I (Chamberlain et al., 
2017; Milne & Szczerbinski, 2009) found low intercorrelations and no common 
factor between different tasks purported to measure differences in global-local 
processing.  
Furthermore, some studies have proposed that people may exhibit trait-like 
variance in their susceptibility to experiencing perceptual illusions (e.g., 
Thurstone, 1944). Although individual differences have been reported in this 
domain and have even been linked to structural differences (Schwarzkopf et al., 
2011), there have been some inconsistent findings concerning whether or not 
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susceptibility to illusions could be regarded as a stable trait or cohesive factor in 
perception. In a more recent study Grzeczkowski and colleagues (Grzecz-
kowski, Clarke, Francis, Mast, & Herzog, 2017) measured the magnitude of 
illusions on six separate illusions but found no evidence of a common factor for 
illusion strength, even when only comparing groups of similarly categorized 
spatial illusions. They did, however, report correlations between different 
versions of the same illusions (e.g., versions of the Ponzo illusion and 
Ebbinghaus illusion), indicating that there is no general tendency for 
susceptibility to various kinds of illusions, but there may exist specific factors 
for narrower categories of illusions. Also, previous studies may have used tasks 
which were too similar, giving an inflated impression of a general factor of 
illusions.  
The review of work presented in Study I revealed that despite many well-
designed studies having been published in the field there is still no clear and 
cohesive understanding of how individual differences are structured in vision, 
and several questions still remain unanswered. Although applying the factor 
analytic approach can be very helpful for elucidating underlying sources of 
functional dimensions and clarifying theoretical constructs, it bears stressing 
that to improve comparability between different studies published in the same 
field the motivations for choices of statistical analyses as well as interpretations 
of factors should be explicitly stated in all publications. 
One relevant factor which may have been overlooked in some of these 
studies and which may deserve more consideration when designing experiments 
with perceptual tasks is the role of top-down effects and experience on different 
levels of perceptual processing. Predictive processing theories have grown in 
popularity and are currently accepted as the basic principle that best encapsu-
lates how adaptively successful vision works, which has resulted in an 
enormous body of work of varying levels of specificity. It is therefore of topical 
relevance to investigate the specific and non-specific factors that determine the 
involvement of top-down predictive processing in creating the subjective 
perceptual experience.  
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3. TOP-DOWN EFFECTS ON PERCEPTION 
At every waking moment our senses are bombarded with complex and varied 
input. In order for our brains to be able to process this information rapidly and 
with optimal use of resources, it is beneficial to initially only extract fast projec-
tions of low spatial frequency information from the environment, thereby 
forming a general gist of the scene and a likely hypothesis of its potential source 
(Bar, 2004). A good perceptual hypothesis helps to organize the sensory input 
and make sense of the data without thoroughly processing each marginal 
feature. Moreover, delving into too much specific and varied detail may derail 
perception from its main task – to quickly discover and prioritize the most 
relevant and salient information from our surroundings which may be vital to 
survival. It has been shown that observers first fixate on the most informative 
aspects of a scene (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999), indicating that the 
perceptual system is motivated to extract relevant contextual information from 
the earliest processing stages.   
Currently, the predictive processing approach to perception and cognition 
has become a dominant force in scientific inquiry on how sensory data and 
cognitive mechanisms interact. It has been well established that perceptual 
processing is enhanced (i.e., the object is recognized faster and more accurately) 
if a stimulus is encountered repeatedly, therefore becoming more predictable – a 
process known as repetition priming (e.g., Tulving & Schacter, 1999). Additio-
nally, if a specific context or category is introduced prior to stimulus presen-
tation, this will influence how the stimulus is perceived. For example, the same 
object can be perceived as a hairdryer or a drill, depending on whether it is 
presented in the context of a bathroom or a garage (Bar, 2004). Such findings 
clearly challenge the traditional view that vision is by and large defined by what 
is signalled with the inflow of sensory information. Instead, earlier experience 
and predictions formed in higher cortical levels have been shown to affect 
perception much more and in a much more dramatic way than has been 
recognized before.  
 
 
3.1. Predictive coding account of perception 
As a rule, most would agree that the purpose of vision is to accurately reflect the 
current state of the environment. It is of vital importance that we be able to 
identify potential threats or relevant social cues in a timely and veridical 
fashion. Overall, as light reflects off surfaces and objects and enters the eye to 
be translated from light energy to neural energy, a realistic representation of the 
environment is formed. Nevertheless, ample empirical evidence demonstrates 
that our perception is far from infallible and is, in fact, quite susceptible to 
various optical illusions and misperceptions. This is often induced by stimuli 
which play on habitual patterns acquired from our experience with the world. A 
good example of this is the light from above prior, as illustrated in Figure 1. The 
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colour gradation on a two-dimensional image of a shape can indicate shadow 
placement, which in a real-world environment is induced by light falling on the 
object. Since we live in a world where the light is generally emitted from a 
source located overhead, shadows appearing at the bottom of the image will 
make the object appear convex, whereas darker gradation at the top will make 
the shape appear concave. Similarly, the image on the left of Figure 1 depicts 
the phenomenon of illusory contours. Despite knowing that there is no objective 
contour to indicate the presence of a white disc on the image – in other words, 
there objectively is no disc at all – it is nearly impossible to not perceive a disk 
overlaid on top of black lines and circles (reviews: Bachmann, 1978; Murray & 
Herrmann, 2013), as it seems more unlikely to encounter four circle fragments 
and two pairs of lines “accidentally” aligned in a collinear arrangement. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of the effects of priors on subjective perceptual experience. The 
image on the left is an example of the “illusory contours” illusion, wherein objectively 
only black lines are drawn, but subjectively a clear impression of a circle occluding the 
pattern of lines emerges. In some cases, viewers even report experiencing the surface of 
the illusory circle as being lighter than the background, hence inducing a vivid percept 
of an object delineated by illusory contours where in fact there is none. The image on 
the right depicts an example of the “light from above” prior. The middle circle in the 
left column is perceived as convex whereas the other circles appear concave. As our 
experience from the environment dictates that sources of light generally shine on the 
objects they illuminate from above, the shadow appearing at the bottom of the shape (as 
opposed to appearing at the top of the shape) will create an impression of a convex 
object. 
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By no means a novel idea (e.g., von Helmholtz, 1867; Gregory, 1980), it has 
now been accepted as fact that perception is not formed only by the incoming 
sensory input, but as a combination of both bottom-up sensory processes as well 
as top-down expectations and predictions. Object recognition is a prime 
example of the role of top-down processing in perception – every day people 
are tasked with recognizing three dimensional objects in the environment based 
on two dimensional images that fall on our retina which look unique from every 
angle and may be explained in several ways. Moreover, objects in the environ-
ment are often not presented in full view. Yet, somehow we are able to 
recognize a cat with ease, even when it is occluded by a fence and could be 
interpreted as separate parts of a cat by a less refined visual system (Hohwy, 
2013). Our brains can make such inferences rapidly and automatically by 
relying on stored memories of past experiences with objects which in this case 
would insist that encountering a whole cat behind a fence is simply a much 
more probable sight. 
Accumulated earlier experience is what probabilistically predicts and there-
fore modulates the results of ongoing actual perception. The probabilistic 
inferences that the neural machinery performs are captured by Bayes’ rule 
which is a theorem of probability theory. According to Bayesian accounts of 
predictive coding (Clark, 2015; Hohwy, 2013; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Rao & 
Ballard, 1999), our brains operate as hypothesis-testing machines, as they are 
constantly comparing incoming sensory information (likelihood) to an internal 
prediction of its source (prior). The predictions are formed based on a pre-
existing model of the world which is built upon previous knowledge and 
expectations about the probability of encountering each visual scene. Predictive 
top-down signals carried by feedback connections are compared to incoming 
sensory information from bottom-up feedforward connections in a hierarchical-
ly organized fashion. Any residuals that cannot be explained away by the 
descending predictive hypothesis are transmitted to higher level areas as error 
signals which lead to the updating of the prediction (and, if necessary, the 
generative model) with the goal to minimize prediction error and improve the 
generative model. Prediction errors are also weighted by precisions which 
determine their relative influence on the subjective percept. Efficient perception 
is therefore the result of an optimally balanced exchange between top-down and 
bottom-up signals. The perceptual system arrives at a uniform percept due to a 
balanced weighting of sensory input and prior predictions. If the conditions 
surrounding the sensory information seem reliable (e.g., looking at an un-
occluded object in daylight) then sensory input leads the investigation. How-
ever, when the sensory information is deemed too noisy or uncertain (e.g., an 
ambiguous shape in the dark) then prior beliefs are awarded more weight which 
can occasionally lead to illusions and misperceptions.  
This principle of prediction error minimization has implications even beyond 
perceptual processing. According to Friston’s free energy principle (Friston, 
2005; 2010) all living systems are motivated to actively minimize prediction 
error (or more generally, free energy) and thereby reduce the entropy of their 
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sensory and physiological states (see also Badcock, Friston, Ramstead, Ploeger, 
& Hohwy, 2019). This can be achieved through modifying predictions or 
adjusting actions to fit the predictions by actively seeking out and revisiting a 
limited set of characteristic phenotypic states. Although in itself a much broader 
computational and philosophical concept that can be applied to all biological 
organisms, the free energy principle is also the foundation for predictive coding 
theories, as it explains action and perception as the means to minimize pre-
diction error. Hence, predictive coding can provide a cohesive framework not 
only for perception, but for explaining a wide scope of psychological processes 
such as cognitions, emotions and actions (Clark, 2016; Hohwy, 2013).  
In the following sections, I will introduce Studies II, III and IV which delve 
into the different types of top-down effects on perception, with implications for 
the predictive coding theory and the issue of individual differences. 
 
 
Study II 
In Study II, we were interested in investigating whether global top-down effects 
modulate objective performance on a low-level perceptual task. The aim of the 
experiment was to study transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) masking 
effects on perception when TMS is applied to higher cortical areas in the frontal 
cortex. Previously it has been consistently shown that a visual stimulus can be 
rendered invisible when disruptive TMS pulses are targeted to the early visual 
cortex after stimulus onset (Bachmann & Francis, 2014), but also approximately 
60–80 ms before the stimulus has been presented (Jacobs, Goebel, & Sack, 
2012). We asked the question whether we would be able to elicit stimulus 
masking by applying pre-stimulus TMS pulses to the frontal cortex, i.e. far from 
posterior visual cortices and high up in the hierarchy of processing levels. If an 
unspecific burst of top-down neural impulses from the frontal cortex can affect 
subsequent visual discrimination, then it is possible that the top-down effects 
may be mediated not only by feedback from the frontal areas after visual 
stimulus specific information has arrived at higher cognitive control levels, but 
also by some unspecific top-down flow of presynaptic afference. To test the 
temporal dynamics of the putative top-down effects we used a range of TMS-to-
target delays, including the critical time frame of 60 ms before stimulus onset. 
Secondly, as the effects of TMS masking have been shown to vary considerably 
over subjects (Corthout,  Uttl, Walsh, Hallett, & Cowey, 1999; Jacobs et al., 
2012), we wanted to know whether individual differences in the expected beha-
vioural effects were reflected in ERP component amplitudes or their latencies. 
To answer these questions, we designed an experiment where subjects 
conducted a simple low-level discrimination task with a small grey Landolt-
type stimulus presented at fixation. The task was to identify on which side of 
the square a gap was located, as well as to give an estimation of the perceived 
clarity of the stimulus on the Perceptual Awareness Scale (Overgaard, Rote, 
Mouridsen, & Ramsøy, 2006). To be able to analyze individual differences in 
top-down modulated perception which are not the result of basic differences in 
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visual acuity, we first determined individual contrast levels for the Landolts in a 
pre-experiment. Each individual’s contrast threshold was selected via fitted 
curve based on six contrast levels to match the level where they had responded 
correctly on 50% of the trials. In addition to the behavioural task we applied 
TMS stimulation to the right frontal cortex of the participants and measured 
EEG from posterior electrodes. TMS was targeted at electrode F2 of the 10–20 
placement system. The TMS pulses (at 55% of maximal output) were applied 
either 140 ms or 60 ms before the stimulus appeared or 20 ms after stimulus 
presentation.  
Results showed that, indeed, objective discrimination performance in the 
perceptual task dropped in the critical -60 ms SOA condition with TMS 
compared to the SHAM stimulation condition. This confirms that TMS pulses 
can affect performance on a perceptual task even when stimulation is directed to 
the frontal cortex prior to stimulus onset. As anticipated, Study II also revealed 
extensive individual variability in behavioural performance, both in the objec-
tive performance on the discrimination task, as well as the subjective clarity 
ratings. To elucidate the source of this variance, we analyzed EEG data col-
lected from 27 electrodes posterior to Cz. We found that the peak latency of a 
late TMS-evoked ERP component P270 was related to the TMS effect on 
behaviour – the earlier the P270 peak was observed, the bigger the observed 
decrease in performance at -60 ms SOA. 
This is a novel finding, because it introduces a new type of masking which 
does not entail masking by another visual stimulus nor is it directly affecting 
visual-processing areas. The effect is therefore nonspecific, as it does not 
originate from areas which encode specific visual features of the target nor as a 
direct result of the specific content processing activity engaged by the frontal 
cortex. The fact that in the condition which led to maximum masking effects 
TMS pulses were applied before a modal visual stimulus had been presented 
stresses the putative non-specificity of the effect. Furthermore, with an additio-
nal pilot dataset (behavioural results reported in supplementary materials, 
available in the online version of the article) we also managed to show that this 
effect was not locally limited to the stimulated F2 area, but the behavioural 
results were equivalent when pulses were targeted to the F4 electrode (pur-
portedly targeting the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g., Karton, Rinne, & 
Bachmann, 2014), providing further support that the effect can be interpreted as 
disruption to some globally ongoing pre-stimulus activation, rather than a local 
disruption directed at frontal visual areas (e.g., the frontal eye fields, FEF). This 
result points to the necessity for future research to experimentally control and 
disentangle specific and nonspecific top-down effects on visual perception, 
especially in light of the assumed content-dependence of predictive coding 
theory. 
The results of Study II support the notion that the way external inputs are 
processed is not determined only by the nature and features of the input, but 
also depends on the prior state of the brain (Jacobs, de Graaf, & Sack, 2014). 
Differences in this baseline activation can potentially explain why subjects 
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respond differently to the same stimulus. For instance, Hesselmann and collea-
gues (Hesselmann, Kell, Eger, & Kleinschmidt, 2008) managed to demonstrate 
that the subjective percept of an ambiguous figure (the well-known face/vase 
figure) was dependent on the individual’s pre-stimulus activity in the fusiform 
face area (FFA). Specifically, activity in the FFA was higher when subjects 
subsequently reported perceiving a face instead of a vase. In Study II, we 
showed that not only does this hold true for specific brain-regions, but the state 
of a nonspecific global network in the prefrontal cortex can also be linked to 
subsequent stimulus processing. Seemingly, there exists a baseline set of 
expectations providing general context and nonspecific activation in preparation 
for perceptual input (Bar, 2009; Clark, 2015).  
In this study we were able to induce a decrease in object discrimination as a 
result of TMS pulses directed to the frontal cortex 60 ms prior to stimulus 
presentation, hence demonstrating global higher-level effects on objective 
perceptual performance. Whether the obtained masking effect is caused by top-
down suppression of visual target signals or top-down facilitation of some 
sources of neural noise remains to be studied in further research. Also, we 
showed that there were substantial individual differences in this effect, reflected 
both in behavioural results as well as in EEG signals. In summary, the results 
from Study II illustrate the importance of descending neural pathways in modu-
lating perception. Furthermore, higher-level factors need to be accounted for 
when studying individual differences in perception.  
 
 
3.2. General and specific effects of priors 
The study presented in the previous section provided some empirical support for 
the role of top-down global networks in modulating low-level perception. 
However, this result implicated some non-specific global modulation effect 
which is difficult to relate to any concrete predictive processes. In the following 
sections, I set out to investigate whether subjective perceptual experience can be 
grouped into a general factor as measured by behavioural perceptual tasks, or 
whether individual differences in perception are better explained by specific 
factors of prior effects. This question was also motivated by the issue of 
construct validity, as highlighted in Study I. The drawback of an all-encom-
passing framework such as predictive coding is in an overly generalized 
approach towards some of its pillar concepts, leading to inconsistent findings. It 
may in fact be that various tasks which are purported to measure the same 
theoretical construct actually capture several independent sources of variance – 
similarly to the global-local dimension (Milne & Szczerbinski, 2009) or the 
theorized factor of susceptibility to illusions (Grzeczkowski et al., 2017). 
Hence, we set out to investigate the sources of specific and non-specific 
individual variance in the effects of priors on perception. 
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Study III 
To tackle the question of whether the effects of priors might share an underlying 
latent factor, we designed Study III where we compiled a battery of four 
behavioural tasks in which top-down effects on perception could be elicited. 
The four paradigms included a Mooney face recognition task, a blur detection 
task, an illusory contours task and a representational momentum task, as further 
detailed below:  
 
1) In the Mooney face recognition task people were shown upright, inverted 
and scrambled Mooney targets (Mooney, 1957) which had been created from 
a freely available database of faces. Original photographs of the faces were 
shown in between blocks of Mooneys, so  that the photo from which a 
stimulus was created was presented after the block where the Mooney first 
appeared and before the block where it appeared a second time, thus 
allowing for a comparison between conditions. The subjects’ task was to 
respond whether the Mooney target corresponded to a face or not. The 
Mooney task has been frequently used to illustrate the effect of prior know-
ledge on perception, as otherwise meaningless Mooney targets become 
disambiguated and are easily recognized as faces after the original image has 
been introduced. We also extracted individual measures to evaluate the bene-
fit on recognition from being presented an upright compared to an inverted 
Mooney face, as well as a rate for false positive responses.  
2) In the blur detection task (Lupyan, 2017) subjects were required to adjust the 
blur level in one letter string to match the blur level of another letter string 
presented simultaneously. The individual letters in the two stimulus strings 
were identical, except that in one of the stimuli they were arranged to create 
a meaningful word. The task illustrates an effect wherein subjects adjust the 
blur level of the target to be sharper if matching it to a meaningful word 
compared to scrambled letters, indicating that intelligible words appear 
subjectively sharper, i.e., in order to experience an equal level of sharpness 
the meaningless string of letters has to be adjusted to a more fine-grained 
level of spatial frequency. The effect is thought to result from the enhanced 
perceptual processing of predictable (familiar) types of stimuli, such as 
words. 
3) In the illusory contours task subjects were shown a Varin shape (Varin, 
1971) wherein the illusory percept of a square is induced by symmetrically 
placed “occluded” circles. Participants were asked to rate the subjective 
clarity of the illusory square on a four-point perceptual awareness scale 
(PAS). The inducing circles were presented at varying contrast levels, which 
allowed us to extract threshold measures of subjective visibility. The task 
was meant to probe a possible trait-like tendency of individuals to rely on the 
expectation of a more probable shape (square on top of circles) as opposed to 
the less likely yet objectively veridical scenario of symmetrically placed 
partial circles.  
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4) Lastly, the representational momentum task was hypothesized to capture the 
relative reliance on predictions as expressed by the magnitude of forward 
displacement. The representational momentum task illustrates an effect 
where subjects misperceive the vanishing point of a moving stimulus when it 
disappears without warning. Arguably, to make up for the delay in pro-
cessing a moving stimulus, the visual system predicts the upcoming location 
of the stimulus based on information gathered from its previous trajectory, 
leaving the impression of smooth movement. Hence, the percept of the 
moving stimulus is always somewhat lagging in relation to its objective 
location, causing the forward displacement or perceived inertia of the target. 
This is supported by findings which have shown that the size of displace-
ment in the representational momentum task depends on the speed of the 
target (Freyd & Finke, 1985), as well as the predictability of its movement 
(Kerzel, 2002).  
 
For the purpose of this experimental study we chose paradigms where partici-
pants had been shown to consistently report a subjective perceptual experience 
which differed from the objective qualities of the task stimulus, arguably as a 
result of top-down effects. The stimuli used in these tasks were purposefully 
distinct, the tasks thereby involving the processing of facial configurations, 
words, illusory contours and even movement. Our goal was to use paradigms 
which only had one particular component in common – the stimuli presented 
were noisy or ambiguous enough so that prior beliefs would be given more 
weight in the subjects’ subjective perceptual experience. We hypothesized that 
if there exists a general factor of “reliance on priors” then people who exhibit a 
tendency to rely on prior beliefs relatively more in one task would also be more 
inclined to weight priors with more precision in the other tasks. In other words, 
if subjects were ranked from most to least likely to report a veridical experience 
of the presented stimulus in each task then these lists of rank order would be 
inter-correlated. Following that reasoning, we would expect positive correla-
tions between the task measures and an emerging general factor of relative 
reliance on priors. 
Our results revealed that one common factor for the relative reliance on 
priors could not be surmised from these four behavioural tasks. The factor 
analysis did not favour a one factor solution, but rather two factors were able to 
best describe our dataset, possibly reflecting the different hierarchical levels of 
the priors recalled in the different tasks. The first factor loaded strongest on the 
Mooney task “false positive” score (i.e., seeing faces where there was a non-
face stimulus) and the “benefit of meaning” blur detection task score. The 
second factor loaded on the illusory contours task score “subjective vividness” 
as well as the Mooney task “benefit of orientation” score. When taking a closer 
look at the possible explanations for this division of tasks, we can hypothesize 
that the first factor captured relatively higher-level priors than the second factor 
(see also the discussion in section 3.3). It would appear that the specific 
characteristics or “types” of priors are of relevance in determining the relative 
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weighting of prior information when confronted with ambiguous or noisy 
perceptual input, which are dependent on the specific tasks used. 
As a limitation to this study, it should be noted that although we interpreted 
the results from Study III so as to indicate that there was no common factor of 
the effects of priors, it may be that the tasks chosen were simply too different. 
This means that whether a common factor for different tasks can be found may 
depend on the set of tasks chosen. Additionally, despite having one process of 
interest in common, this may not have been the only source of individual 
variance we were measuring. Although we were following in the footsteps of 
previous work in a similar vein, it remains a possibility that other studies have 
also erred against this principle. It may also be that the factor analytic approach 
is not the best method to apply on varied behavioural data when measured on 
modest sample sizes. 
 
 
Study IV 
Study III explored tasks where priors had influenced the subjective perception 
and interpretation of actually present stimuli. In Study IV, we created a situation 
where the subjective percept was of a stimulus which had not been presented at 
all. The series of tasks compiled for these experiments, including one which was 
used in an earlier work by Aru and Bachmann (2017; see also Bachmann & 
Aru, 2016), resemble the phenomenon introduced by Ellson (1941) and 
illustrated more recently by Powers, Mathys and Corlett (2017) wherein the 
repeated presentation of a visual and auditory stimulus simultaneously will lead 
to the “hallucination” of the auditory stimulus when on some trials only the 
light is presented. In other words, by conditioning the expectation of the two 
stimuli always being presented together a misperception of the stimulus that is 
absent from the screen can be evoked. We managed to show that this pheno-
menon also occurs when two visual stimuli are simultaneously presented by 
using a dual-task setup where one stimulus was more relevant to task perfor-
mance than the other.  
In Study IV, we conducted two experiments (E1 and E2) with analogous 
versions of the same general task wherein attention is diverted towards a main 
task while the secondary task stimulus is occasionally removed from the screen. 
Participants were repeatedly shown two types of simultaneously presented 
stimuli (for example a face and a square around the face, as in E1) while they 
maintained central gaze fixation. After the briefly visible stimulus screen had 
disappeared from view, they were either asked a categorical question about the 
face or to rate the clarity of the square on a PAS-like scale. In the majority of 
trials, the question was about the face, making it the main and therefore the 
expected stimulus, and only in about 10% of trials were participants asked to 
rate the secondary stimulus. In a few critical trials (six in E1 and four in E2) the 
secondary stimulus was absent from the screen while participants were still 
asked to provide clarity ratings. To compare, an experimental situation where an 
attended task-relevant stimulus is suddenly absent from the screen would elicit a 
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prediction error (and the subject would likely notice its disappearance). How-
ever, in a situation where attention is divided between two spatially separate 
stimuli, such that one of those stimuli is more relevant to the task goals than the 
other, the secondary stimulus is deemed less relevant and processed in less 
detail. The degraded sensory information of the auxiliary stimulus will then in 
turn allow for more weighting of the expectation to see both stimuli in unison, 
even though in some trials one of the stimuli is actually absent.  
In addition to the original task introduced in earlier experiments (Aru & 
Bachmann, 2017; Mack, Erol, Clarke, & Bert, 2016) we developed two new 
tasks for the purpose of this study with a slightly different experimental design, 
varying some aspects of the tasks such as stimulus content (faces and simple 
square shapes instead of letters and circles as in the earliest version) and the 
position of the critical stimulus (presented at fixation or in the periphery). We 
also added more critical trials compared to the original work to ascertain 
whether this effect is indeed as common as we suspected. To allow for better 
comparison, two tasks in E2 were applied to the same sample – since the degree 
of illusory perception being experienced relied on subjects not being made 
aware of the true purpose of the experiment, we refrained from conducting all 
three tasks on the same sample (also the long runtime would have been very 
taxing). 
The results of the study showed that, indeed, in all three tasks most people 
reported having perceived the missing stimulus on at least one of the critical 
trials, although individuals varied greatly in the amount of illusory perception 
reported. The correlation between illusory perception scores in the two tasks 
measured on the same sample did not reach significance. However, the two 
tasks did differ in some respects, including task difficulty and types of stimuli 
used, which may account for the low correlation. We also found that illusory 
perception is qualitatively different from real perception, as the ratings given to 
real squares were higher compared to illusory squares. This indicates that the 
phenomenon we measured might be comparable to studies which have managed 
to superimpose mental imagery to real stimuli (Brockmole, Wang, & Irwin, 
2002). In this case, the expectation to see the square could have evoked a mental 
representation of the square from memory which was superimposed on the 
visual scene. However, because the scene at the locus of the expected stimulus 
was empty and the subjective vividness of true perception is arguably higher 
than that of imagery, the clarity ratings for the “hallucinated” stimuli had to be 
relatively lower. In other words, the illusory percept was convincing enough to 
induce several reports of clear perception, but the overall subjective quality of 
the illusory percept was poorer. Also, the reaction times to critical trials were 
slower, indicating that there was a moment of hesitation before replying. 
One could argue that in this study we might have measured judgement or 
decision bias rather than differences in true percepts, especially considering that 
clarity ratings between critical trials and regular trials were correlated. It is true 
that we could not disentangle actual perceptual experience from judgement, as 
we measured illusory perception via self-reported awareness ratings. Neverthe-
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less, there are arguments in favour of having captured a real subjective expe-
rience of an illusory object. Firstly, from a procedural standpoint it should be 
noted that we debriefed participants after participating in the experiments 
presented in Study IV and found that many subjects responded with sincere 
surprise, having been convinced that the auxiliary stimulus was present through-
out all trials. Secondly, it is not very likely that participants would use more 
than one level of clarity ratings for “hallucinated” stimuli when responding 
according to pure response bias without a concomitant phenomenal experience 
of the expected stimulus. Thirdly, from the perspective of the questions posed in 
the framework of this dissertation I would argue that although a valid qualm, it 
can be viewed as a secondary issue to the main research question. We were 
specifically interested in the effects of expectations on the subjective perceptual 
experience which may inherently include a degree of judgement. However, to 
further verify this hypothesis we aim to include EEG measures in future work to 
investigate whether there are differences in brain correlates between critical 
trials where illusory perception was experienced and those where no misper-
ception occurred. 
 
 
3.3. Different types of priors 
In the previous section, I summarized the results from Study III and Study IV. 
We found that no one general factor of reliance on priors emerges when people 
perform several tasks where the subjective perceptual experience of a stimulus 
differs from its objective qualities. We also found that even two very similar 
tasks where expectation creates the misperception of a missing stimulus were 
only poorly correlated. This indicates that there may in fact be many different 
types of priors which are dependent of the specific task at hand. 
Types of priors can be classified in several different ways. For example, 
Seriès and Seitz (2013) proposed a broad conceptual distinction of contextual 
and structural priors. This is a simple division which is intuitively easy to grasp. 
Contextual priors are limited to the specific situational expectations, such as 
task instructions and priming by previously presented contextual cues, and are 
thereby more malleable by short-term influences. On the other hand, structural 
priors are acquired through long-term learning and are less susceptible to 
external influences from instructions and general knowledge. Structural priors 
are also rather broad which means that they can be generalized to different 
contexts. For example, consider the illusory-contoured object and light-from-
above prior depicted in Figure 1: even though we know that most of the con-
tours are illusory, we cannot shake the illusion in our perception. The structure 
of the depicted features and their arrangement enforces the automatic illusion of 
a more probable geometrical shape occluding some parts of the symmetrically 
placed line arrangements. Likewise, the light-from-above prior is a low-level 
structural expectation which we have acquired due to living in an environment 
where the light is usually emitted from above. The same illusion would 
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automatically be evoked with other shapes which have respectively shaded 
areas in the top or bottom parts of the objects. Nevertheless, even structural 
priors such as the light from above prior can be contextually updated as a result 
of relearning, although this effect has been shown to be temporary (Adams, 
Kerrigan, & Graf, 2010; Kerrigan & Adams, 2013).  
Using the example of the Mooney task from Study III, for instance, the three 
measures we extracted from the task all fall somewhat differently on the 
structural-contextual axis (also, see Figure 2 for an illustration of where each 
task used in Studies III and IV might be placed along this dimension). The 
benefit of seeing an upright face compared to an inverted face on accurately 
recognizing a Mooney target as a face can be interpreted as the most structural 
prior of the three measures. A preference for recognizing upright faces com-
pared to inverted faces is a well-documented effect (e.g., Farah, Tanaka, & 
Drain, 1995; Valentine, 1988; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2005) which is thought to 
develop in children (to a comparable level as the face inversion effect in adults) 
between 5 and 10 years of age  (Pascalis, Demont, de Haan, & Campbell, 2001; 
Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004). It is likely that the emergence of this prefe-
rence develops due to years of accumulated experience with predominantly 
upright faces. The false positive score in the Mooney task, however, implicates 
a somewhat more contextual prior of having the expectation to look for and see 
faces within the context of the task. Even more contextual still (although, note 
that this measure was removed from the final analysis in Study III) is the benefit 
in recognition after viewing the original face photograph which helps to 
disambiguate a previously incoherent Mooney target. Clearly, this effect is 
induced by a very short-term temporary prior and is unlikely to be generalized 
to other Mooney shapes seen during the rest of the experiment.  
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Figure 2. An illustrative conceptualization of the tasks used in Study III and Study IV, 
as approximated based on the types of priors evoked. Depicted is their placement on the 
structural-contextual dimension (x-axis) as well as along the relative hierarchical 
processing levels (y-axis). The conditioning task (in pink) indicates the mutually 
analogous tasks used in Study IV; the tasks in green ovals represent the different 
measures extracted from the Mooney task. 
 
 
Seriès and Seitz (2013) did not implicate a specific hypothesis regarding the 
neuronal basis for structural and contextual priors, nor is it clear whether they 
share the same overall mechanism in the brain or are dichotomous entities. 
Instead, this distinction could be better thought of as a functional dimension, 
distinguishing priors by how they were acquired (innate/long-term versus short-
term priors) and whether they are general or contextually specific. An 
alternative and somewhat complementary dimension for operationalizing the 
effects of priors on perception, which is more rooted in the neural architecture 
of perceptual processing, concerns the relative positioning of the evoked prior 
within the cortical hierarchy. A low-level prior induced by basic perceptual 
features functions at a hierarchically lower level than priors which are related to 
more complex associated features or semantic content. It can be argued that 
individual differences in the effects of higher-level priors which affect priors at 
higher processing levels (such as task instructions, individual beliefs) are less 
effective in modulating low-level priors which may depend more on differences 
in sensory processing (Figure 3). In other words, low-level priors (e.g., the 
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light-from-above prior) are more likely to be shared by most individuals 
(Hohwy, 2013) and be less malleable to induced shifts in knowledge. Support 
for this notion can be found in literature on brain anatomy, which posits that 
individual variability is significantly greater in the association cortex compared 
to more low-level unimodal cortical regions (e.g., Laumann et al., 2015; 
Mueller et al., 2013). In short, individual differences probably exist in all 
dimensions of priors, but may be induced by different triggers. Hence, tasks 
which employ higher level priors are likely to not correlate well with tasks 
which rely on low-level priors and may exhibit orthogonal correlations with 
other phenomena (see also the discussion on schizotypy in section 4.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A general abstract framework for conceptualizing the various factors that 
affect priors at different levels of the perceptual processing hierarchy. Individual diffe-
rences may occur at all processing levels, but arguably to a different degree, as higher-
level priors are more susceptible to individual differences (lighter shade of blue) than 
lower level priors (darker shade). The boxes on the right exemplify some factors which 
can influence priors at different levels, suggesting that higher level priors are more 
malleable to contextual manipulations. 
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As described in section 3.2, both the Mooney “benefit of orientation” score and 
the illusory contours “subjective vividness” score captured in the first factor of 
Study III can be interpreted to represent effects of mid-level priors involved in 
perceptual organization, as they reflect preferential processing of familiar 
shapes (upright face compared to an inverted face; square on top of circles as 
opposed to symmetrical circles with slices cut out of them). Long-term expe-
rience with squares as common geometrical shapes induces the perceptual 
experience of a square occluding four stacked circles as opposed to a less likely 
occurrence of circles with symmetrical slices cut out of them. Similarly, long-
term experience with faces creates the preferential processing of upright versus 
inverted faces. Both can also be seen as structural expectations acquired through 
life-long experience and are thereby unlikely to be dependent on situational 
context. The second factor loaded on the Mooney task “false positive” score and 
the “benefit of meaning” blur detection task score which can be placed relati-
vely higher on this dimension, as they call upon the use of more category-
specific priors. Participants were tuned to expect words and faces due to the task 
design which activated a narrower category of expectations than in the first 
factor. However, some effects of structurally imprinted syntax rules of learned 
language acting in an automatic mode may be also hypothesized. It should be 
noted that none of the measures from Study III captured truly high-level 
attributes, such that would be induced by introducing shifts to the explicit 
knowledge and beliefs of the participants. The representational momentum 
“displacement” score, in turn, could be seen as the odd one out, as it arguably 
evoked the most low-level prior compared to the other tasks and loaded most 
weakly (and negatively) on the factors. It also included a moving stimulus 
whereas the other tasks applied static targets.  
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4. SUBOPTIMAL PERCEPTUAL PROCESSING 
Another question that this dissertation aimed to address is whether these indi-
vidual differences in the effects of priors that we were able to demonstrate 
within the neurotypical population can also be linked to other individual trait 
measures, specifically those related to the autism spectrum and schizotypy.  
In the previous chapters I have discussed some of the predictive mechanisms 
that have been implicated in determining how the sensory input and prior beliefs 
are integrated to form a subjective percept. The goal of this system is ultimately 
to minimize prediction errors and to identify the model that most veridically 
captures reality. An optimal perceptual system can estimate the reliability of the 
incoming sensory information in order to judge whether to continue sampling 
the environment at an even deeper level of scrutiny or to trust the predictive 
hypothesis. The occasional errors or misperceptions illustrated by optical 
illusions are merely the trade-off cost for having an automatic and efficient 
processing brain and are normally easy to correct by actively participating in the 
environment (e.g. moving an ambiguous object to a more illuminated area or 
touching its surface to ascertain its identity). This delicate balancing act of top-
down and bottom-up signalling implies that if any systematic flaw were to 
occur in such a complex mechanism, it could lead to very real disadvantages in 
navigating daily life. 
The predictive coding framework has, among other things, been used to 
explain the cognitive mechanisms involved in certain mental disorders, most 
commonly the processes involved in the symptomatology related to autism and 
schizophrenia. Although two distinct neuropsychiatric disorders, autism and 
schizophrenia share certain phenotypic similarities and occasional comorbidity 
(Chisholm, Lin, Abu-Akel, & Wood, 2015). For example, both exhibit menta-
lizing and social functioning deficits (Ciaramidaro et al., 2014) as well as 
atypical characteristics in sensation and perception. Historically, autism and 
schizophrenia were even hypothesized to be the same disorder (De Crescenzo et 
al., 2019), or alternatively two diametric opposites of the same spectrum (Crespi 
& Badcock, 2008; Crespi, Stead, & Elliot, 2010). According to predictive pro-
cessing models, although the two are viewed autonomously, both autism and 
schizophrenia display perceptual symptoms which can be understood in terms 
of an imbalance between top-down signals and bottom-up sensory information. 
 
 
4.1. Autism 
Autism spectrum disorder (henceforth ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder 
characterized by social communication deficits and repetitive restrictive beha-
viours and interests (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Indi-
viduals with ASD often exhibit a strict adherence to rigid routines and may 
experience distress in response to small changes. ASD has also been linked to 
enhanced perceptual functioning in several perceptual tasks, including superior 
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performance in visual search and discrimination tasks and an overall detail-
focused processing style (Frith & Happe, 1994; Joseph, Keehn, Connolly, 
Wolfe, & Horowitz, 2009; Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 
2006), as well as a decrease in global processing (Happé & Frith, 2006). This 
pattern of increased attention to detail along with a failure to contextualize sen-
sory information into global regularities translates well into predictive pro-
cessing terms as an expression of the suboptimal balance of prior and likelihood 
weighting where the balance is shifted away from prior knowledge (or towards 
sensory information). It has been suggested that individuals with ASD expe-
rience the world in an overly realistic way due to the increased imprecision of 
predictions or alternatively from increased sensory precision (Friston, Lawson, 
& Frith, 2013; Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Van de 
Cruys et al., 2014). More specifically, they may have trouble generalizing 
information into generative models based upon which predictions are formed. 
For instance, this could explain why autistic individuals find social contexts 
challenging, as they may have trouble inferring general rules of social inter-
action from the specific characteristics presented by every unique person, 
thereby treating each encounter as a novel experience. Additionally, due to 
increased weighting of prediction errors, new and uncertain conditions evoke 
relentless prediction error signals, causing distress to the individual. In recent 
years more nuanced hypotheses on the predictive processing account of autism 
have been proposed, including for example the role of volatile environments as 
a trigger to the aforementioned perceptual atypicalities. However, there is still 
no clear consensus about whether autistic traits inevitably lead to deviant effects 
of priors on perception (e.g., Utzerath, Schmits, Kok, Buitelaar, & de Lange, 
2019), leaving the question open for additional research. 
As there is much heterogeneity along the autism spectrum, it has been 
proposed that autistic-like traits can also be found in the neurotypical population 
(e.g., Ruzich et al., 2015). The continuum hypothesis of psychopathology 
suggests that some of the symptomatology underlying clinical disorders may be 
expressed as extreme deviations in characteristics which also vary in the neuro-
typical population (Van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & 
Krabbendam, 2009; Verdoux & Van Os, 2002). In order to test whether autistic 
traits measured in a neurotypical population would exhibit this general tendency 
of attenuated priors in our selected perceptual tasks we included the Autism-
Spectrum Quotient (AQ) questionnaire in Studies III and IV. The AQ is a self-
administered questionnaire with 50 items which was developed by Baron-
Cohen and colleagues (2001) to measure the continuum of autistic traits both in 
the clinical and non-clinical samples. The AQ has been shown to be an effective 
tool in distinguishing those with ASD from people without such a diagnosis 
(Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen, & Weelwright, 2006), but its measurements also 
follow a normal distribution of variance in the neurotypical population (Ruzich 
et al., 2015). Following the reasoning of the continuum hypothesis, we moved 
forward with the assumption that the AQ can serve as a measure of relative 
positioning along the autistic spectrum in the neurotypical population. We 
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reasoned that if the hypothesis of attenuated priors in autism (Pellicano & Burr, 
2012) held true, then people who scored higher on the Autism Quotient scale 
(i.e., displayed more autistic traits) would experience (and report) more 
veridical percepts of stimuli which have typically shown strong modulation by 
priors; i.e., they would exhibit relatively less reliance on priors in the perceptual 
tasks compared to people who scored lower on the questionnaire.  
In Experiment 1 of Study IV (E1), we found a significant negative corre-
lation between the AQ score and the illusory perception score. In other words, 
people who reported more autistic traits on the questionnaire experienced less 
illusory perception. This supports the general hypothesis that autistic traits are 
related to a more realistic perception of the physical world. Importantly, we did 
not find a correlation between the AQ score and visibility ratings in trials where 
the auxiliary stimulus was present, therefore we cannot explain this link merely 
with the autistic trait signalling greater attention to detail and better perception 
in general. However, in the other two tasks the correlations between the 
frequency of illusory perception and AQ scores were not significant. While we 
cannot say with certainty why this pattern of results emerged, it implies that 
previously suggested links between the autistic trait and performance on a 
perceptual task depend greatly on the specific features and demands of each 
task. In this case, participants reported more illusory perception in E1 compared 
to the tasks in E2. The task in E1 had six critical trials where no auxiliary 
stimulus appeared compared to the tasks in E2 which only had four critical 
trials. This may have allowed for more individual variety to be revealed, 
possibly explaining why the correlation with AQ scores was only significant in 
this task. It has also been suggested that most perceptual atypicalities in autism 
are revealed only in volatile or unstable environments (Cassidy, 2018). 
Although we did not specifically manipulate or control for volatility in our 
tasks, it could be argued that the use of occasionally invalid arrow cues in E1 
may have rendered the experimental design relatively more volatile compared to 
the tasks in E2 where the stimulus screen setups were more predictable.  
In Study III, we did not find any links between the AQ score and the five 
extracted measures of relative reliance on priors. Again, we may cite the lack of 
volatility in the experimental paradigms as one possible reason why we were 
unable to find evidence in support for the weak priors hypothesis. Certainly, this 
is one aspect which should be better controlled for in future experiments. How-
ever, there are other experimental factors which may have affected this result as 
well. Numerous studies have reported differences in the perceptual performance 
of people with autism in various kinds of tasks (Behrmann, Thomas, & 
Humphreys, 2006), yet not all of these links have been replicated when using 
slightly different paradigms or conditions. For instance, while it is widely 
reported that autistic people experience a local processing bias instead of global 
precedence as most neurotypical people do (for a review see Happé & Frith, 
2006), others have shown that there are no group differences between the 
autistic and control group in global-local tasks (e.g., Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, 
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Brereton, & Tonge, 2000). Therefore, the effect may depend on the specific 
paradigm and conditions used.  
Another possible explanation for the lack of correlations in our studies is that 
the continuum hypothesis simply may not be accurate for the autism spectrum. 
There have been conflicting findings regarding whether tendencies found in a 
clinical sample carry over to the neurotypical population, or if they can be 
replicated to a comparable degree (Karvelis, Seitz, Lawrie, & Seriès, 2018; Van 
de Cruys et al., 2017; Williams, 2018). Differences between a clinical sample 
and a non-clinical sample may be more pronounced which results in distinctive 
patterns of perceptual processing between the two groups. Alternatively, the AQ 
may not be the best measure for ranking neurotypical individuals on the autistic 
spectrum. While the AQ has been widely used to quantify autistic traits both in 
the clinical and non-clinical populations, it relies only on self-ratings of beha-
viour and subjective experience and hence may not be applicable as a proxy for 
ASD proper (Gregory & Plaisted-Grant, 2016).  
In summary, autism, much like most clinical constructs is a very complex 
phenomenon of phenotypically diverse and interacting features. There may be 
more intricate predictive models that are a better fit for explaining the comple-
xity of different clusters of symptoms. It has recently become a point of public 
discourse that the construct of autism may well be too broad to capture precisely 
enough the full scope of the multifaceted symptomatology present in indivi-
duals who have received this diagnosis. Not all autistic individuals are charac-
terized by the same symptoms, therefore individual profiles need to be con-
sidered when trying to make inferences regarding the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms in autism. As it can be problematic to rely only on questionnaire 
measures to score individuals on a diagnostic spectrum, consulting with 
clinicians at different stages of empirical research should also be considered a 
requirement. Currently, the exact nature of perceptual differences in autism still 
remains unclear. 
 
4.2. Schizophrenia 
The schizophrenia spectrum is another group of disorders that has been 
attempted to be explained in predictive processing terminology, partly due to its 
extensive sensory and perceptual symptoms. Schizotypal personality disorder 
(SPD), although categorized as a personality disorder, is included in the schizo-
phrenia spectrum. It can be distinguished from schizophrenia by subthreshold 
symptoms that are associated with persistent personality features (DSM-5, 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and may sometimes precede the onset 
of schizophrenia. The main features of SPD include pervasive social and inter-
personal deficits, cognitive or perceptual distortions and eccentricities of beha-
viour, including magical thinking, paranoid ideation and unusual perceptual 
experiences.  
As opposed to the weak priors hypothesis of autism, the hallucinations 
characteristic to the schizophrenia spectrum and psychotic disorders can be 
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explained as resulting from overly strong priors (Powers et al., 2017; Schmack 
et al., 2013; Teufel et al., 2015). Hallucinations are perhaps the most extreme 
form of illusory perception, as they are percepts which have not been activated 
by any corresponding external stimulus (Tracy & Shergill, 2013) and can there-
fore be assumed to consist only of internal input. The fact that the content of 
hallucinations often reflects personal beliefs as well as cultural background 
(e.g., Kent & Wahass, 1996) supports the idea that hallucinations emerge within 
the context of individual and subjective prior experience. 
Importantly, links with suboptimal perceptual processing have also been 
detected in non-clinical samples in covariance with psychosis proneness, as 
approximated by higher scores on schizotypy measures (Partos, Cropper, & 
Rawlings, 2016; Teufel et al., 2015; for a review see also Nelson, Seal, Pantelis, 
& Phillips, 2013). To measure individual differences in schizotypal personality 
in the non-clinical population we included the Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire-Brief (SPQ-B, Raine & Benishay, 1995) in Study III. The 
questionnaire was developed as a self-report measure to assess features of SPD 
(as defined by DSM-III-R) in the general population, both for research and early 
screening purposes. From the perspective of our research question, we were 
especially interested in possible correlations between task performance and the 
Cognitive-Perceptual Deficits sub-factor of the SPQ questionnaire. 
In our study we found that the SPQ-B subfactor score was significantly and 
negatively correlated with the representational momentum “displacement” score 
and the Mooney “benefit of orientation” score, indicating that participants with 
higher scores for schizotypal traits relied relatively less on prior knowledge in 
these tasks. Although some studies have suggested the opposite – that schizo-
typal traits are related to stronger priors (Teufel et al., 2015, Powers et al., 
2017), studies published in recent years tend to support the opposite hypothesis 
(Stuke, Weilnhammer, Sterzer, & Schmack, 2019; however, see Corlett, Horga, 
Fletcher, Alderson-Day, Schmack, and Powers, 2018, on the remaining contro-
versies concerning this hypothesis). Sterzer and colleagues have greatly contri-
buted to providing a framework which would be able to explain some of the 
opposing accounts on the very complex and multifaceted symptoms related to 
schizophrenia (Sterzer et al., 2018; Heinz et al., 2018), including the possibly 
separate cognitive mechanisms that contribute to the development of halluci-
nations and delusions. As such, they have also highlighted differences in the 
hierarchical levels of processing – namely, that low-level processing in schizo-
typal individuals has been associated with decreased priors, whereas higher 
level processing has been linked to increased use of priors (see also Schmack et 
al., 2013). This is usually explained to mean that inherently weak or imprecise 
priors at lower levels are compensated for by a reliance on overly precise high-
level priors. Our results are in general consistent with this hypothesis, since 
both the representational momentum task as well as the inversion effect in face 
processing represent relatively low-level priors.  
In conclusion, the role of priors and prediction errors in autism and 
schizophrenia is still unclear. From the studies presented here it is evident that 
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the previously proposed hypotheses for explaining the perceptual atypicalities 
found in autism and schizophrenia are overly simplistic. More nuanced theore-
tical hypotheses have been put forward in recent years and will hopefully bring 
more clarity to this relevant issue. It has been proposed that different types of 
priors are linked to symptoms of schizophrenia in different ways. The same may 
be true for autism – for instance, some studies have shown that there are no 
group differences between ASD patients and controls in the effects of low-level 
priors (e.g., Croydon, Karaminis, Neil, Burr, & Pellicano, 2017). This suggests 
that aberrant precision in autism may only emerge in the higher associative 
stages of predictive processing related to making inferences about more 
complex contextual sensory context (such as social interactions). There are still 
inconsistent findings regarding whether tendencies found in a clinical sample 
carry over to the non-clinical population (Karvelis, Seitz, Lawrie, & Seriès, 
2018; Van de Cruys et al., 2017; Williams, 2018), but there is potential in 
continuing research also with non-clinical samples to systematically study the 
mechanisms underlying varying degrees of atypical perceptual processing. It 
would however be more prudent to link such differences to narrower clusters of 
symptoms instead of making inferences on a broad spectrum of disorders to 
help develop more sensitive instruments in assessing symptom-based markers 
of individual vulnerability to suboptimal perceptual processing.  
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The predictive coding theory offers an appealing framework not only for 
studying how the brain is organized, but also how the mind works in general 
and in all its individual varieties. In this dissertation I provided some theoretical 
background as well as an overview of gaps in our current knowledge regarding 
the structure of individual differences in visual perception. I also highlighted the 
role of predictive processes as an important factor in shaping the individual 
perceptual experience. While studying robust group effects has provided us with 
invaluable knowledge regarding general principles of perceptual mechanisms, it 
is the individual (mind’s) eye that holds a vault of treasures yet to be dis-
covered.  
In the empirical part of this dissertation, I introduced four published studies 
with the aim to contribute to ongoing work in the field. In Study I, I provided a 
review of recent research which has attempted to clarify general and specific 
factors in vision, also stressing some common pitfalls related to the factorial 
analytic approach. In Study II, we demonstrated a novel masking effect in a 
basic visual discrimination task which emerged when applying non-specific 
TMS pulses to the frontal cortex at a critical timeframe before stimulus onset, 
illustrating the role of descending neural pathways in early visual processing. In 
Study III, we compiled a battery of perceptual tasks where prior effects of 
subjective perception had been demonstrated, to explore whether there is a 
general factor for relative reliance on priors. We found that individual variance 
in those tasks was better described by two factors which reflected the different 
hierarchical levels of the priors evoked. In Study IV, we showed that illusory 
perception of an absent stimulus can be reliably evoked in a dual-task setup by 
repeatedly strengthening the expectation to see two stimuli presented simulta-
neously. The results suggest that illusory perception is quite common under 
certain conditions, but also displays rather large differences between individuals 
as well as between analogous tasks. Lastly, we used questionnaire measures of 
the autistic and schizotypal traits in Study III and Study IV to investigate 
whether the predictive processing account of suboptimal prior precision in 
autism and schizophrenia would find support within the neurotypical popu-
lation. Overall, we concluded that the proposed hypotheses are likely too simp-
listic to capture the complexities of perceptual atypicalities in these spectrums. 
Due to the small sample sizes across these experiments (which were 
motivated by practical constraints), the findings presented in this dissertation 
ought to be replicated and expanded upon. Ideally, future research should aim to 
be more interdisciplinary and collect data from larger samples using multiple 
comparable tasks. Brain measures should also be included to further explore 
links with structural and neural differences, as well as the mechanisms behind 
nonspecific versus specific activation which has been shown to influence 
subjective perception.  
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The main takeaways from this dissertation are as follows: 
 
1) Studying individual differences is useful for understanding how the mind is 
organized. In this dissertation I have argued that studying systematic indivi-
dual variability helps to elucidate the cognitive mechanisms involved in per-
ceptual processing, as well as providing an important research tool for 
construct validity. 
2) Specifically, measuring performance in multiple paradigms that share a 
common mechanism helps to test the conceptual applicability of a construct. 
Studies using different paradigms to make inferences about the same 
phenomenon has led to a literature of conflicting findings, as even small task 
differences may affect results. On the one hand, this is reflected in an 
existing replication crisis, but may also hint at a problem of construct 
validity in the field. While a theoretical framework is necessary and useful 
for posing hypotheses and designing experiments, an overly broad or gene-
ralized conceptualization of constructs will, however, muddle rather than 
clarify the state of our understanding. 
3) The aforementioned rationale was illustrated by several studies into the 
effects of priors on perception. Based on findings highlighted in this disser-
tation, I argued that there is no one universal underlying factor for the 
relative reliance on priors, rather there are multiple types of priors which are 
also modulated by the specifics of each task.  
4) Using a multi-paradigm design allows for the application of latent variable 
analysis which is a favoured approach when trying to detect common factors 
or shared mechanisms of interest. Nevertheless, it is important to maintain 
experimental and statistical rigour and be transparent in reporting results to 
such analyses to improve the possibility of comparing results which is 
essential to get a full picture of the structure of vision.  
5) Understanding the sources of long-term individual differences in perceptual 
processing is relevant not only for understanding optimal perception, but 
also the mechanisms underlying suboptimal perceptual processing. This 
offers potential for practical implications in the clinical field for the purpose 
of clarifying the clusters of symptoms that could share a common 
mechanism. Some of the previous hypotheses suggested for explaining 
disorders such as autism and schizophrenia have been too broad, and a more 
nuanced approach is necessary. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Uurimus individuaalsetest erinevustest ennustuste  
mõjus nägemistajule 
  
Viimaste aastekümnete jooksul on üheks mõjukaimaks lähenemiseks kogniivse 
neuroteaduse valdkonnas kujunenud ennustava kodeerimise teooria, mis kätkeb 
endas elegantset ja intuitiivselt kergesti hoomatavat raamistikku ajutegevuse ja 
inimkäitumise paremaks mõistmiseks. Erinevalt klassikalisest nägemistaju 
käsitlusest, mille kohaselt on tajusisu kujundatud eelkõige välismaailmast tuleva 
tunnetust toitva infotulva poolt (n-ö alt-üles signaalid), postuleerib ennustav 
kodeerimine, et erinevates töötlusetappides on kriitiline roll ka aju enda gene-
reeritud hüpoteesidel ehk ennustustel sisendi võimaliku päritolu ja iseloomu 
kohta (n-ö ülalt-alla aktiivsus). Nimelt toimub aju hierarhilises närvivõrgustikus 
paralleelselt kahes suunas liikumine, kui ülalt-alla suunduvaid hüpoteese esin-
davaid aktiivsusmustreid eri töötlustasemetel sissetulevate signaalidega võrrel-
dakse. Selliseid ennustusi suudab aju tekitada olemasoleva mudeli põhjal, mis 
hõlmab aastate jooksul akumuleerunud kogemuslikke teadmisi ümbritseva 
keskkonna tunnuste tõenäosuslikest seaduspärasustest. Ennustuse eesmärk on 
pakkuda välja ammendav seletus tunnetuslikele signaalidele; kui aga ennustus 
eksib, vallandub veasignaal, mis omakorda saadetakse ajukoore hierarhia kõrge-
matele tasemetele, et uuendada ennustust ning vajadusel ka olemasolevat mu-
delit. Üldjuhul on keskkond, milles me eksisteerime, stabiilne ja toimib ootus-
päraste reeglite ja printsiipide alusel. Näiteks võime üsna enesekindlalt lähtuda 
eeldusest, et päike valgustab objekte suunaga ülevalt allapoole. Taoline eeldus 
võib aga mõnikord põhjustada tajupetteid (näiteks nagu kujutatud joonisel 1). 
Kuna aju tõlgendab kahemõõtmelise kujutise puhul tumedamaid piirkondi 
varjudena ning lähtub eeldusest, et ülalt suunduva valgusjoa tõttu langeksid 
varjud objekti allosasse, võib varjude paigutumine vertikaalsel teljel jätta muude 
omaduste poolest samast objektist mulje kui vastavalt reljeefsest „muhkjast“ või 
„lohkjast“ objekti pinnast. Erinevad optilised illusioonid ongi kõige värvika-
maks näiteks sellest, et kiire ja efektiivse taju eesmärgil võib tajusüsteem meid 
teinekord petta, kuna lähtub ka kahedimensionaalsete kujutiste tõlgendamisel 
reeglitest, mis püstitatud kolmedimensionaalses keskkonnas õpitud seadus-
pärasuste alusel. 
Käesolev väitekiri keskendub individuaalsete erinevuste uurimisele eespool 
kirjeldatud raamistikust lähtudes. Kuna ennustav kodeerimine sätestab, et taju-
kogemus koosneb alati nii objektiivse sensoorse info kui ka subjektiivse ennus-
tuse kombinatsioonist, on püsivad individuaalsed erinevused subjektiivses taju-
kogemuses selgitatavad ebakõlaga nende kahe komponendi vahelises tasa-
kaalus. Näiteks on selle käsitluse abil püütud seletada mõningaid vaimseid 
häireid, mida iseloomustab ebatüüpiline tajukogemus. Sellisteks häireteks on 
muuhulgas autism ja skisofreenia. Ühe hüpoteesi järgi võiks autismi selgitada 
kui sensoorse signaali tähtsustamise poole kaldu olevat süsteemi – selliselt, et 
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välismaailmast omandatud informatsiooni on raskem üldistada ühtseks mude-
liks, mille põhjal teha olukorda sobituvaid ennustusi. Seetõttu on autistlikud ini-
mesed tihtipeale sotsiaalses keskkonnas ülekoormatud ja stressis, kuna ei suuda 
rakendada inimeste sotsiaalsete vihjete tõlgendamiseks üldiseid seaduspärasusi 
ning tajuvad kõiki detaile kui uudset informatsiooni, mis kurnab tajusüsteemi ja 
vallandab häirivaid veasignaale. Skisofreeniat seevastu on püütud tõlgendada 
kui liigset toetumist ennustussignaalidele, mis seletaks hallutsinatsioonide ja 
sundmõtete tugevalt subjektiivset komponenti. 
Väitekirja üheks eesmärgiks oli anda ülevaade värsketest edusammudest 
individuaalsete erinevuste ja nende struktuuri uurimises nägemistaju valdkon-
nas, kuna seni pole veel ühtse selge arusaamani jõutud. Sellega tegeles Uuring 
I, mis andis ülevaate viimase kümne aasta jooksul tehtud nägemistajuga seon-
duvatest faktorstruktuuri uuringutest. Muuhulgas on püütud leida nägemistaju 
soorituses mõõdetavat analoogi intelligentsusuuringutes levinud üldisele „g 
faktorile“ ehk teisisõnu nn „v faktorit“, mida saaks seletada kui üldist ühisosa, 
mis on seotud kõikide madala taseme nägemisülesannete sooritustega. Seega, 
kui üks inimene on osav mõnes tajulises eristusülesandes, on tal tõenäoliselt 
kõrgem tulemus ka teistes tajusooritusülesannetes. Ülevaatelisest meta-taseme 
uuringust ilmnes, et sellist faktorit nägemistajus tõenäoliselt ei esine ning näge-
mistaju funktsioonid on pigem paremini kategoriseeritavad kitsamate visuaal-
sete oskustena, mis piirnevad sarnast tüüpi ülesannetega. Samuti kajastas  
ülevaateuuring eksperimente, mis olid keskendunud kõrgema taseme faktorite 
tuvastamisele nägemistajus, näiteks seoses individuaalsete erinevustega 
globaalse-lokaalse töötluse automaatses eelistuses või üldises tendentsis olla 
vastuvõtlikum illusioonide tekkimisele. Tulemustest võis järeldada, et raken-
dades ühel valimil mitut erinevat katseparadigmat (mida on varasemalt kasuta-
tud vastava dimensiooni mõõtmiseks), ei suudetud ühist faktori leida. See viitab 
probleemile konstruktivaliidsusega, millest tingituna võivad näiliselt sama 
mehhanismi illustreerivad katseparadigmad mõõta tegelikult erinevaid asju. 
Sellest probleemistikust lähtuvalt püstitasime küsimuse, kas individuaalsed 
erinevused ülalt-alla mehhanismide mõjus nägemistajule võiksid samuti tule-
neda mingist ühisest allolevast allikast, näiteks üldisest tendentsist toetuda taju-
otsuste tegemisel suhteliselt rohkemal või vähemal määral ennustushüpoteesile. 
Esmalt viisime läbi Uuringu II, mis püüdis vaadelda ülalt-alla signaalide mõju 
lihtsa tajuülesande sooritusele. Planeerisime eksperimendi, kus katseisiku üles-
andeks oli lahendada lihtsat tajuülesannet, samal ajal kui suunasime parem-
poolsesse frontaalsesse ajukoore sagarasse transkraniaalse magnetstimulatsioo-
niga (TMS) magnetimpulsse, mis olid ajastatud kolmel erineval ajahetkel stii-
muli ilmumise suhtes. Tulemused näitasid, et katseisikute sooritus halvenes 
märkimisväärselt katsetingimuses, kus TMS impulss suunati ajukoorde 60 ms 
enne stiimuli ilmumist. Ka varasemalt on näidatud, et nägemispiirkonda (nt 
esmastes nägemiskeskustes kuklasagaras) TMS-iga stimuleerides võib juba 
enne stiimuli esitamist kutsuda esile soorituse halvenemise. Küll aga on tege-
mist uudse leiuga, kuna stimuleerisime eesmist ajukoort, mis on otsestest 
nägemistaju töötluspiirkondadest kaugemal. Seega näib, et ka üldine mitte-
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spetsiifiline neuraalse aktiivsuse foon mõjutab tõenäoliselt ülalt-alla juhteteid 
pidi madala taseme nägemistaju protsesse. Samuti leidsime, et TMS-iga esile 
kutsutud maskeerimisefektis oli märkimisväärseid individuaalseid erinevusi, 
mis kajastusid ka elektroentsefalograafiga (EEG) mõõdetud elektrilises aktiiv-
suses. 
Lisaks tahtsime teada, kas ülalt-alla ennustuste mõju individuaalsetele erine-
vustele võiks ka käitumuslikes tulemustes grupeeruda ühe ühise faktorina või 
pigem mitme spetsiifilistele mehhanismidele omase faktorina. Selleks valisime 
Uuringu III jaoks välja neli tajuülesannet, mille puhul oli varasemates uuri-
mustes näidatud, et üldiselt raporteerivad inimesed sellist subjektiivset taju-
kogemust, mis erineb mõne omaduse poolest objektiivsest kujutisest, mida 
ekraanil näidatakse. Näiteks näevad inimesed geomeetrilise kujundi illusoorseid 
kontuure, mis tegelikult moodustuvad ainult sümmeetriliselt paigutatud joonte 
koosmõjul, kuigi tajutud geomeetrilist kujutist reaalselt ei olegi (vt joonis 1) või 
tajutakse kahe uduse tähekombinatsiooni puhul teravamana seda, mis moodus-
tab tähendusliku sõna, võrreldes kombinatsiooniga, millel tähenduslik sisu puu-
dub. Selliste ülesannete puhul arvatakse, et kuna tunnetuslik sisend on nendes 
situatsioonides mõnevõrra ebamäärane või mitmeti tõlgendatav, toetutakse taju-
kujutise loomisel rohkem ennustusele, mis kasutab selleks varasemaid koge-
musi ja pakub välja hüpoteesi kõige tõenäolisema tajukujutise kohta. Välja-
valitud nelja tajuparadigma andmeid analüüsides leidsime, et üks ühine faktor ei 
suuda ära seletada individuaalseid erinevusi, mis ilmnesid ennustuste mõjus 
tajule. Pigem seletas antud katse tulemusi paremini kahefaktoriline mudel, mis 
näis peegeldavat tajusüsteemi hierarhilist struktuuri: omavahel olid rohkem 
seotud ülesanded, mis rakendasid madalama taseme ennustusi ning teisalt need 
ülesanded, mis kutsusid esile mõnevõrra kõrgema taseme ennustusi. On siiski 
võimalik, et omavahel sarnasemate ülesannete puhul oleks mingi üldisem faktor 
välja joonistunud. 
Seega planeerisime Uuringu IV, kus kavandasime kolm analoogset taju-
ülesannet, mis põhinesid samal nähtusel – kui esitada ekraanil lühikese kest-
vusega kaks stiimulit, mis ilmuvad ja kaovad alati samaaegselt, on võimalik 
„tingida“ tugev ootus, et tegemist on usaldusväärse seaduspärasusega, mistõttu 
kui üks stiimulitest jääb mõnel katsekorral esitamata, siis inimesed raportee-
rivad endiselt subjektiivset tajukogemust kujutisest, mida tegelikult ekraanil ei 
olnud. Sellist olukorda võib tõlgendada seega kui ootuse mõju illusoorse taju 
tekitamisel. Siiski kasutasime taolisi katsekordi katse jooksul pigem vähe 
(umbes 2% tervest katsest), kuna vastasel juhul võiks katseisik märgata reeglis 
muutust ning ennustust uuendada. Antud katsega suutsime näidata, et sellistel 
tingimustel „hallutsineerimine“ on pigem tavaline ning seda esines enamikul 
katseisikutest vähemalt ühel korral katse jooksul. Küll aga ilmnesid märkimis-
väärsed erinevused nii indiviidide kui ka erinevate ülesannete vahel, mis viitab 
sellele, et antud nähtuse täpseid toimimistingimusi tuleks veel põhjalikumalt 
uurida. 
Viimaks, et uurida individuaalsete erinevuste võimalikke seoseid autistlike 
ning skisotüüpsete joontega, lisasime Uuringusse III ja IV küsimustikud, 
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mõõtmaks nende seadumuslike joonte esinemist tavapopulatsioonis. Tahtsime 
teada, kas hüpoteesid, mis on püstitatud kliinise populatsiooni põhjal seoses 
patoloogia tingimustes häirunud tajuga, oleksid tajuerisustega seotud ka tava-
populatsioonis. Tulemused osutasid, et vaatamata ühes osas katsetest leitud 
seosele need hüpoteesid meie valimi ja ülesannete puhul tervikuna paika ei 
pidanud. See võis olla tingitud asjaolust, et tavapopulatsioonis ei väljendu need 
seosed nii selgelt. Samuti võis üldkehtiva seadupärasuse mitteleidmine tuleneda 
ülesannete erisustest. Patoloogiakalduvuse suhtes tundlik võib olla vaid kitsalt 
spetsiifiline ülesanne. Samuti on tõenäoline, et sedavõrd lihtsad hüpoteesid, mis 
tõlgendavad häireid kui ebakõla sensoorse info ja ennustuse tasakaalus, on liialt 
lihtsustatud ning komplekssete sümptomite mõistmiseks peaks rakendama 
märksa nüansirohkemaid seletusi. 
Kokkuvõtvalt panustas käesolev väitekiri olemasolevate teadmiste täienda-
misse mitmes olulises aspektis. Esiteks näitasin erinevat tüüpi tajuülesannete 
toel, et ennustused mõjutavad nii subjektiivset tajukogemust (Uuring III, IV) 
kui ka objektiivset tajusooritust (Uuring II, III). Samuti sai  kinnitust, et subjek-
tiivset tajukogemust stiimulist, mida tegelikult ei nähtud, on võimalik ennustusi 
“tingides” esile kutsuda mitmes omavahel analoogses ülesandes (Uuring IV), 
näitlikustades seeläbi, et tegemist on normipärase tajutöötluse omadusega. Olu-
lise uuendusena vastas Uuring III küsimusele, kas individuaalseid erinevusi 
ennustuste mõjus saaks vaadelda kui ühisest allikast tulenevaid. Tulemustest 
ilmnes, et ühte ühist faktorit antud uuringus kasutatud ülesannete puhul and-
metest järeldada ei saa – pigem peegeldasid tajumõõdikute omavahelised seosed 
erinevaid töötlushierarhia tasemeid.   
Lisaks empiirilisele panusele argumenteerisin väitekirja teoreetilises osas 
individuaalsete erinevuste uurimise olulisuse üle, mis on väärtuslikuks töö-
riistaks nägemistaju universaalsete mehhanismide ja strukturaalse ülesehituse 
kaardistamiseks. Lisaks optimaalse tajustruktuuri lahtimõtestamisele aitab indi-
viduaalsete erinevuste uurimine paremini mõista mõningaid vaimseid häireid 
iseloomustava suboptimaalse tajutöötluse alusmehhanisme ning leida, millised 
katseparadigmad on perspektiivikamad vaimse seisundi haavatavuse seiretestide 
väljatöötamiseks. Sealjuures tasub eksperimendi kavandamisel kaasata mitu 
sama protsessi mõõtvat ülesannet, et tagada konstruktivaliidsus ja tuua esile 
võimalikud ülesandespetsiiflised erisused ja sarnasused. 
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